



# Intelligence Information Cable

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 9 DECEMBER 1970

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/USSR

DOI 21-24 NOVEMBER 1970

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN HANOI ON  
UNITED STATES' BOMBING ATTACKS

## C O R R E C T I O N

A FOUR-PAGE INFORMATION REPORT WITH THE ABOVE NUMBER WAS ISSUED ON 1 DECEMBER 1970. THE SUBJECT OF THAT REPORT SHOULD BE CHANGED TO READ AS IT APPEARS ABOVE AND THE FOLLOWING DELETIONS SHOULD BE MADE: (IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SUMMARY) "AND COMMANDO ATTACK ON THE PRISONER OF WAR (POW) CAMP ON 21 NOVEMBER"; (IN THE FIRST

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1516-119-2

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
(classification)

(dissem controls)

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SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH ONE: "ON 21 NOVEMBER AND COMMANDO ATTACK  
AGAINST THE POW CAMP IN THE HANOI AREA." IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF  
THE SUMMARY THE WORD "RAID" SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "RAIDS."

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

[REDACTED]

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DIST 1 DECEMBER 1970

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/USSR

DOI: 21-24 NOVEMBER 1970

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY [REDACTED] FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN HANOI  
ON THE 21 NOVEMBER UNITED STATES' BOMBING ATTACKS  
AND COMMANDO RAID ON THE PRISONER OF WAR CAMP

SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

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END SUMMARY.

1.

DID NOT CONSIDER THE UNITED STATES' BOMBING RAIDS ON 21 NOVEMBER AND COMMANDO ATTACK AGAINST THE POW CAMP IN THE HANOI AREA TO CONSTITUTE AN ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT DRV OFFICIALS UNDERSTAND, EVEN THOUGH THEY DENOUNCE THESE ACTIONS, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE RECONNAISSANCE

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FLIGHTS OVER NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT DRV ATTACKS ON THESE PLANES WILL BRING COUNTERSTRIKES BY THE UNITED STATES. THE DRV ACCEPTS THIS SITUATION AND IT WILL NEITHER DETER DRV FROM ATTACKING THESE PLANES NOR PRECIPITATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DRV FROM THE PARIS PEACE TALKS.

2. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROGRESS AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, [REDACTED] SAID HE BELIEVED LITTLE WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED UNTIL THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION CHANGED ITS APPROACH OF ATTEMPTING TO BARGAIN FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH. HE CITED THE AMERICAN RETALIATION AGAINST THE MISSILE SITES ON 21 NOVEMBER AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS POSITION.

3. ASKED WHAT ROLE HE FORESAW FOR THE ICC SHOULD A PEACE AGREEMENT BE ACHIEVED IN VIETNAM, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION WAS RATHER THEORETICAL AT THIS TIME BUT THAT IN 1954 THE ICC HAD BEEN QUITE EFFECTIVE IN EXTRICATING THE TWO SIDES. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION OF ENLARGED MEMBERSHIP OF THE ICC WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL<sup>A</sup> PEACE AGREEMENT WAS IN SIGHT. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THE THIEU-KY-KHIEM REGIME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WAS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PEACE. WHEN TOLD THAT PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN T H I E U HAD NOT YET DECLARED HIS INTENTION TO BE A CANDIDATE IN THE 1971 ELECTIONS

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AND MIGHT WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS RATHER THAN BE AN OBSTACLE TO PEACE, [REDACTED] EXPRESSED HIS SURPRISE TO HEAR THAT THIEU MIGHT NOT ATTEMPT TO RETAIN HIS POSITION BUT WAS SKEPTICAL OF THIEU'S SINCERITY. CONCERNING GENERAL DUONG VAN "BIG" MINH POSSIBLY ENTERING THE WINNING THE 1971 ELECTIONS AND THE EFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON THE DRV POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THIS AS A MATTER FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, COMPLETELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT MINH MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT AS A MEMBER OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE GENERAL SERGEY KAPALKIN EXPRESSED AN OPINION ON THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND REACTION TO DRV ATTACKS AGAINST THESE FLIGHTS SIMILAR TO THAT EXPRESSED THE PREVIOUS DAY [REDACTED]. HE ALSO FELT THAT THE 21 NOVEMBER ATTACKS DID NOT INDICATE A CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES' POSITION. KAPALKIN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE AMERICAN RAID ON THE SUSPECTED POW CAMP HAD BEEN MADE 50 KILO-

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

METERS NORTHWEST OF HANOI AND THAT HE HEARD ARTILLERY FIRING THE MORNING OF 21 NOVEMBER TO THE WEST OF HANOI AND SAW THE GLOW CREATED BY MUZZLE FLASHES. HE SAID HE HAD LEARNED THAT OVER 200, PROBABLY 230 AND POSSIBLY AS MANY AS 300, UNITED STATES SORTIES HAD BEEN FLOWN IN THE AREA SOUTHWEST OF VINH.

5. NO FIRINGS OF SA-2 SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES (SAM) WERE HEARD DURING THE EARLY HOURS OF 21 NOVEMBER IN DOWNTOWN HANOI. TWO SAMs WERE LAUNCHED FROM A POSITION SOUTHEAST OF THE PETIT LAC AREA AT 0900 HOURS ON 21 NOVEMBER. THERE WERE FREQUENT SAM LAUNCHES IN THE MORNINGS AND AFTERNOONS MOST DAYS OF THE FOLLOWING WEEK.

6.

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